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negotiate trade agreements is a little like 
using the Third Fleet to achieve adjust-
ments to NAFTA� Frankly, that is exactly 
what French sees as the future role of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 
once the PLAN’s growing size helps to 
reduce U�S� influence in China’s sphere�
French’s most significant observation— 
unique among similar books—is that the 
American-centric nature of most assess-
ments of the PRC’s rise blinds us to the 
fact that most Chinese do not regard the 
United States as its primary, long-term 
enemy� Rather, Japan is perceived as the 
once-and-future foe that deserves the 
most retribution for China’s “century 
of humiliation�” French illustrates the 
popularity of this mainland view by 
examining the composition of the PRC’s 
entertainment media� “[T]o turn on 
the television in China is to be inun-
dated with war themed movies, which 
overwhelmingly focus on Japanese 
villainy� More than two hundred 
anti-Japanese films were produced in 
2012 alone, with one scholar estimating 
that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas 
involve Japan-related war plots” (p� 21)� 
Thus, in French’s estimate, it would not 
be tension over islands (some of them 
false) in the South China Sea that would 
result in inadvertent war, but rather an 
escalating dispute over the Senkakus�
French has done an excellent job of iden-
tifying the ties between dynastic China’s 
open tian xia policies and PRC president 
Xi Jinping’s aspirations for the future� 
French points out the ironic similarities 
between Xi’s rhetoric and that of the 
Chinese communists’ greatest enemy, 
Chiang Kai-shek, over the rightful domi-
nance of China in Asia� Their desired 
rules for international politics resemble 
those represented in Thucydides’s 
Melian Dialogue� French recounts that 
when a Singaporean deputy expressed 
support for a maritime code of conduct 
at a recent multilateral conference, 
Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi 
responded, “China is a big country and 
other countries are small countries 
� � � and that’s just a fact” (p� 126)�
Everything under the Heavens is both 
an informative book and an enjoyable 
read� One hopes it will make the overly 
optimistic think a little bit harder about 
future relations between China and the 
rest of the world� However, in the end, 
French—whether by personal nature or 
intellectual predilection—feels com-
pelled to offer only optimistic recom-
mendations� “A China that is treated 
as an equal with much to contribute to 
human betterment,” he writes, “but met 
with understated but resolute firmness 
when need be, is a China that will 
mellow as it advances in the decades 
ahead, and then most likely plateau” 
(p� 284)� Of course, how to be both 
understated and resolute in an increas-
ingly shrill world is the unanswered 
dilemma� The problem with hugging 
(or scolding) the panda is that it bites�
SAM J� TANGREDI
Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in 
Norway, 1940, by John Kiszely� New York: Cam-
bridge Univ� Press, 2017� 390 pages� $44�99�
Anatomy of a Campaign by John 
Kiszely provides an excellent historical 
review of the military campaigns in 
Norway in 1940� In his book, Kiszely 
takes the reader on an exciting journey 
following the British expeditionary 
military campaign in Norway� He 
asks for and investigates the reason 
behind the failure� Was it poor military 
performance, lack of intelligence, or just 
poor strategy and decision-making? 
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This journey takes the reader beyond the 
obvious historical causes and looks at 
the underlying reasons for the blunders 
in operational and strategic decision-
making� Compared with other books 
written about the German and British 
campaigns in Norway, this dissection 
of the “anatomy” of a campaign is more 
applicable to military campaigns today�
Kiszely looks into the structural 
functions of the campaign and how they 
related to each other to find out what 
did and did not work� Since the military 
campaign links the political objective to 
military ways and means, he claims the 
outcome of the campaign was a given—
even before the first shot� The book is 
valuable because the lessons from the 
Norwegian campaign demonstrate the 
relations between strategy and policy 
and the effect on the operational and 
tactical levels� Modern campaigns build 
on experience from the past, and readers 
will appreciate this honest dissection as 
the author shares his own insight from 
joint strategic military and operational 
experience� Kiszely is a retired, highly 
decorated British officer and a soldier 
with operational command experience 
in national and international operations, 
as well as service on the Joint Staff�
The author examines the challenges 
that Great Britain faced in the transition 
from peace to war� How does a country 
move from a peacetime organization and 
optimize the ways and means to achieve 
strategic ends? His insight into British 
decision-making and the relationship 
between military leaders and their 
political masters is an outstanding as-
sessment of a strategy-policy mismatch 
and shows how a service-oriented 
approach to a military campaign utterly 
fails� Modern, theater-level campaigns 
are orchestrated at the operational level 
to synchronize joint-service contribu-
tions� Kiszely claims that unique, 
British, service-oriented leadership 
contributed to a disconnect between 
strategic- and tactical-level objectives� 
British military culture at that time was 
founded on superior improvisation and 
ad hoc adaptation� Services conducted 
separate operations driven by German 
military initiatives, and those operations 
sometimes were counterproductive 
to the theater campaign� Today’s 
commanders should not overlook the 
lessons that his insight provides�
The author makes a convincing argu-
ment that understanding expeditionary 
operations and campaigns is vital to 
managing the strategic and grand 
strategic environments� On the grand 
strategic level, the British struggled to 
formulate common political objectives 
with its allies, which had a direct 
effect on the conduct of the campaign� 
Domestic politics influenced the 
national decision-making, and the need 
to do something haunted the Allied 
coalition� Even as the security situation 
obviously required the Allies to build 
up forces on the continent to meet 
the threat from Germany, forces were 
diverted to a secondary front in Norway, 
for which they were not prepared�
Those directing multinational 
operations need to consider how to 
build political and military unity into 
a campaign� According to Kiszely, the 
Allies and Germany approached strategy 
and policy very differently because of 
their opposing political orientations: a 
democratic coalition on the one hand 
and an authoritarian regime on the 
other� The German decision-making 
in this phase of the war had strategic 
advantages, as its policy and campaign 
plans were synchronized, whereas the 
Allied coalition was not able to adapt 
to the operational tempo and unite 
around a coherent grand strategy�
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Kiszely provides a convincing argument 
that the foundation for German success 
was theater-level strategy and manage-
ment of the campaign� Even though the 
Allies had local successes, as demon-
strated in the battle of Narvik, their 
tactical achievements were not embed-
ded in a grand strategy or theater-level 
objective for winning the campaign�
In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the 
campaign in Norway was a decisive 
victory for the Germans, in that they 
achieved strategic surprise and dominat-
ing airpower� The main reason for the 
British campaign failure is found in 
the link between policy and plans� The 
ends were not supported by available 
means and ways, and policy became 
divorced from reality� Such determina-
tions leave the reader to evaluate and 
decide where the responsibility for 
the failure of the campaign lies�
The book summarizes key military 
lessons learned and strategic guidance� 
I strongly encourage national security 
advisers and military leaders to read it�
LARS SAUNES
The Cold War: A World History, by Odd Arne 
Westad� New York: Basic Books, 2017� 720 pages� 
$40�
Odd Arne Westad has taken on a 
difficult task: providing a one-volume 
history of the Cold War� The U�S�-Soviet 
confrontation lasted over four decades 
and had many episodes� Cramming the 
entire story into one book—even one 
that is over seven hundred pages long—
is no simple thing� Westad made his task 
even harder by taking an international 
focus and starting his coverage in the 
1890s, with the politicization of the 
confrontation between labor and capital�
However, Westad is certainly up to the 
task� He is something of a transnational 
man� Although Norwegian, he holds a 
PhD from a U�S� school (the University 
of North Carolina) and has taught in 
both the United Kingdom and the 
United States� This book is the product 
of research in archives around the planet 
(Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South 
Africa, and the United States) and the 
reading of other source material pub-
lished in German, French, Chinese, and 
Norwegian� An important advantage to 
this book is that it is an easy read, which 
is crucial, given its length� It is easy for 
historians to get trapped in the details of 
their research and skimp on their analy-
sis and writing� That is not the case here� 
Westad covers events in a compelling 
but concise manner� At times, though, 
the reader might wish that he had 
provided more documentation of his 
arguments, since his footnotes often do 
not show from where his evidence came�
The chapter on the ideological elements 
of the confrontation before the 1940s 
is less than convincing, but fortunately 
short� Westad sustains these arguments 
better in the body of the text� In World 
War II, capitalism and communism 
worked together not because of the Nazi 
threat but only because of the Germans� 
“Some form of postwar conflict was 
next to inevitable” (p� 68)� Joseph Stalin 
was a brutal dictator, but he also was 
indecisive and let European affairs 
drift, while the United States acted� As a 
result, Washington had more to do with 
turning the postwar confrontation into 
a sustained Cold War than did Moscow�
One of the central arguments of this 
book is that the Cold War was about 
more than the United States and the 
Soviet Union� On this point, Westad is 
certainly correct; the question is one 
of emphasis� He gives a good deal of 
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